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Contact-tracing is an essential tool in order to mitigate the impact of pandemic such as the
COVID-19. In order to achieve efficient and scalable contact-tracing in real time, digital devices
can play an important role. While a lot of attention has been paid to analyzing the privacy and
ethical risks of the associated mobile applications, so far much less research has been devoted to
optimizing their performance and assessing their impact on the mitigation of the epidemic.
We develop Bayesian inference methods to estimate the risk that an individual is infected. This
inference is based on the list of his recent contacts and their own risk levels, as well as personal
information such as results of tests or presence of syndromes. We propose to use probabilistic
risk estimation in order to optimize testing and quarantining strategies for the control of an
epidemic. Our results show that in some range of epidemic spreading (typically when the manual
tracing of all contacts of infected people becomes practically impossible, but before the fraction
of infected people reaches the scale where a lock-down becomes unavoidable), this inference of
individuals at risk could be an efficient way to mitigate the epidemic. Our approaches translate
into fully distributed algorithms that only require communication between individuals who have
recently been in contact. Such communication may be encrypted and anonymized and thus
compatible with privacy preserving standards. We conclude that probabilistic risk estimation
is capable to enhance performance of digital contact tracing and should be considered in the
currently developed mobile applications.
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Motivation One of the main tools public health authorities use to mitigate the spread of a
pandemic, such as COVID-19, is the trace-test-isolate strategy. Identifying, calling, testing, and if
needed quarantining the recent contacts of an individual who has just been tested positive is the
standard route for limiting the transmission of a highly contagious virus. This standard strategy
proves its efficacy at early stages of the epidemic, when the number of newly infected individuals
is small enough to be manageable by reasonable-scale manual contact tracing infrastructures.
However, it cannot be applied as such when the epidemic starts to spread faster, because the
average number of contacts of a typical individual in the few days before he is tested positive can
be large, not all contacts are with people known to the individual, and manual tracing incurs
delays during which infected contacts keep on spreading the virus.
For these reasons, and taking into account the properties and parameters of the COVID-19
epidemic, digital contact tracing was convincingly argued to be a viable route to mitigation of
COVID-19 and other similar epidemics [1]. Current mobile phone technology indeed enables
automated, real-time proximity tracing between individuals and many works in this direction
were initiated and deployed in past months [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6]. With currently developed mobile
applications, the distance and duration of a contact between two individuals can be estimated.
Furthermore, contextual or health information about individuals can be included as well. This
tracing can be used while preserving the privacy of each individual’s information, the level of
privacy protection depending on the protocol. While many works have been devoted, justifiably,
to the compatibility of privacy and tracing, see e.g. [2, 4, 6, 7, 8], much less work is available
concerning the assessment of the efficiency of tracing in mitigation of the pandemic. Most
considered systems use the tracing data simply as a fast and scalable device to identify all recent
contacts, in order to notify and perhaps isolate all of them.
In this paper we show that approximate Bayesian probabilistic inference techniques allow to
use the data exchanged by the tracing applications in order to provide highly accurate estimates
of the probability that any given individual is infected. This estimate can then be used in order
to focus the tests and other interventions on the group of individuals who have the largest
probabilities of being infected, even if they do not show symptoms. The contact-tracing protocols
that we propose require individuals that have been in contact in the recent past to be able to
exchange messages about their risk level. When two individuals meet, they exchange a small
amount of information (typically through Bluetooth). Later on, these individuals exchange
messages carrying information about their current status, e.g. an increased risk due to presence
of syndromes associated with the illness or due to their history of past contacts. Probabilistic
inference then concatenates this information from all past contacts locally on the individuals
phone and sends updates of the status to their contacts.
We shall describe hereafter two concrete algorithms to perform the inference; one which is more
accurate, based on Belief Propagation [9], and a second one which is a simpler approximation
based on the so-called Mean-Field method. The latter requires smaller communication bandwidth
between devices and could be potentially more privacy-friendly. Both the algorithms are inspired
by our previous work [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17], and adapted to the present contact tracing
problem. For a given testing capacity we show, through extensive simulation on realistic models
for COVID-19 diffusion, that both methods allow to significantly reduce the impact of an outbreak
and eventually contain the epidemics in many cases where standard tracing protocols fail to do
so. We additionally evaluate robustness of the methods to presence of false negative tests as well
as partial adoption of the contact-tracing mobile applications.
Related work While most considered systems use the tracing data simply as a fast and scalable
device to identify all recent contacts, works aiming at estimating the risk of infection appeared
recently. These include a machine learning based risk estimation proposed in [5], that provides
only limited validation of the approach even on data specific to the privacy preserving protocol,
and is thus difficult to directly compare to our approach. Preliminary version of our work was
first presented in Ellis COVID-19 workshop [18]. An approach similar to our MF algorithms
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was proposed by [19] using Monte Carlo sampling to estimate the corresponding probabilities.
This work does not provide validation of the approach involving the control of the epidemic.
Another recent work estimating the risks from the tracing data is [20] that is in the spirit similar
to our work, it uses Monte Carlo sampling based estimations of the risks. The authors of [20]
evaluate their approach only on data that come from the model that is assumed in the inference
algorithm. A key aspect of our work is that we test on data coming from a much more complex
model than assumed when designing the inference algorithm [21]. We believe that this is crucially
important for eventual validation on real world contact data, which are not available to us at
this point. We note that the authors of [20] evaluate their approach on networks up to 10k
individuals, compared to 500k used in our simulations. As is common with Monte-Carlo schemes,
convergence properties could significantly deteriorate with system size. The lack of separation
between the epidemic generating model and the inference procedure in the implementation of
[20] makes it difficult for us to compare directly to our approach, and we thus leave it for future
work. The python code used for our simulations [22] is modular and comparisons with other
inference procedures can be performed by adding new modules.
Scheme of propagation A convincing validation of any individual-level intervention policy
requires extensive simulations by means of sufficiently detailed agent-based models. In such
models, at each time, a given individual is in a state that belongs to a finite set of possible
states, like for instance susceptible, exposed, infected-asymptomatic, infected-asymptomatic, in
ICU, recovered, or dead. The most accurate mathematical descriptions of COVID-19 epidemic
propagation are based on complex multi-state compartment models, in which infected individuals
are not immediately contagious upon infection, may be asymptomatic or develop mild/severe
symptoms with some delay, and the ages, households and workplaces are also taken into account.
Even though the long-term effects of SARS-CoV-2 infection are still under study, it seems
reasonable to assume that some level of immunity is developed with recovery, so that the
individual progression through the epidemic compartments is not recurrent (a recovered person
typically does not become infected again). The observation of non-trivial distributions of
incubation and recovery times as well as that of time-dependent viral transmission capacity
[23, 24, 25, 26, 26] indicate that the most realistic models for SARS-CoV-2 infection clearly depart
from the simplest, and largely adopted, Markovian epidemic models. In addition, such models also
provide representations of the time-varying contact network over which viral transmissions occur,
some including real-world mobility data [27] or computer-generated synthetic surrogates [21, 28].
In particular, the model in Ref. [21] simulates the spread of COVID-19 in urban age-stratified
populations with a multi-layer contact network (see also Supplemental Material A for details).
Bayesian Epidemic Tracing Information regarding the status of tested or symptomatic in-
dividuals can be used in different ways within a contact tracing procedure. In the simplest
situation, the observation of an infected individual involves tracing (a fraction of) his recent
contacts in order to prevent/contain further transmissions of the infection. It is also possible
to infer transmission chains and detect the parent cases which are the origin of the infection
detected in an individual. In a Bayesian approach, this is made possible assuming as a prior a
particular probabilistic model of epidemic propagation and using it to define a likelihood function
conditioned on the evidences coming from observational data, i.e. tests (PCR and/or serology)
and self-reported symptoms from a fraction of the individuals. As we shall show, the adopted
prior inferential model provides the mathematical framework for developing risk assessment, but
it does not need to reflect the real epidemic spread in all its details in order to allow for valuable
inference. Indeed, for epidemic propagation generated with complex agent-based models along the
lines described above, we show that the approximate computation of local probability marginals
can be effectively obtained using as a prior much simpler inferential models. In practice in this
paper we use a simple agent-based Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model. We emphasize
that, depending on the approximate inference technique used for computing such probability
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marginals, some of the ingredients of realistic epidemic propagation can be reintroduced, such as
non-Markovian evolution between states, time-dependent infectiousness or more compartments.
Here we propose two distributed algorithms for risk estimation from contact tracing data,
which are both derived within a Bayesian framework and based on a message-passing principle:
Mean-Field (MF) algorithm and Belief Propagation (BP) algorithm. They both provide estimates
of the time-dependent local probability marginals of being infected which can be used to estimate
the risk level of each individual; this risk of being infected can in turn be used to implement a
sanitary protocol, like suggesting higher risk individuals to be tested and/or quarantined. The
main differences between these methods, which are presented in the next section, are in the
accuracy of the approximation of the epidemic dynamics and in the way in which observational
data are incorporated into the probabilistic model.
Methods We use the Bayesian approach that is based on a prior description of the epidemic
process, and a method to include the information from observations. We present here, and use
in this paper, a prior description based on a discrete-time Markov chain corresponding to the
SIR model. It can be generalized to non-Markovian, continuous-time, and other model settings.
Let xti be the state of an individual at time t (it is convenient to think of t as a number of
days), with xti ∈ X and X a finite set of epidemic states. We use X = {S, I,R} for the case in
which the susceptible (S), infected (I) and recovered (R) individual states are considered. The
state of individual i at time t, xti, depends on her state at the previous time, and on the states
at time t − 1 of all the individuals j that she has met between times t − 1 and t. We denote
by ∂i(t) this set of individuals, and by xt−1∂i = {xt−1j } for j ∈ ∂i(t). Then p
(
xti|xt−1∂i , xt−1i
)
is the
probability of individual transitions for i occurring between time t− 1 and time t. For the SIR
model, this probability depends on the following parameters:
• the recovery rate µi, defining the daily probability that the infected individual i moves to
the recovered state ’R’;
• the transmission rates {λk→i(t)}k∈∂i(t), which are the probability of infection from an
infected k to a susceptible i on day t.
Let x =
{
xti
}t=0,...,T
i=1,...,N
be a collective time-trajectory generated by the epidemic. The prior
probability associated with this trajectory is defined by
p (x) =
∏
i
p
(
x0i
) T∏
t=1
p
(
xti|xt−1∂i , xt−1i
)
, (1)
where we assumed a factorized probability of initial state x0 = {x0i }i=1,...,N , i.e. p
(
x0
)
=∏
i p
(
x0i
)
.
We can now include the effects of observations. Given a set O of observations O = {Or}r∈O,
where each observation r provides some information on the state of an individual at a given time
(as the result of tests, or of individual symptoms), and assuming that these observations are
statistically independent, the posterior probability of the trajectory x can be expressed using
Bayes theorem as
p (x|O) = 1
p (O)p (x)
∏
r
p (Or|x)
=
1
p (O)
∏
i
p
(
x0i
) T∏
t=1
p
(
xti|xt−1∂i , xt−1i
)∏
r
p (Or|x) . (2)
For the BP approach, we start from the posterior at (2) and remark that it can be written as:
p (x|O) = 1
Z
∏
i
ψi (xi,x∂i) . (3)
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Belief Propagation [9] can then be used to estimate marginal posterior probabilities from (3).
However, a straightforward factor graph representation [29, 30] of (3) with {xi} as variable nodes
and the compatibility functions {ψi (xi,x∂i)} as factor nodes, contains many short loops, so that
the corresponding BP equations would not be exact even when the underlying contact network
is acyclic. We instead construct a factor graph representation that closely reflects the topological
structure of the contact network by associating the individual trajectories of a pair of individuals
in contact, and involves BP messages mij (xi,xj) for pairs of trajectories. The corresponding
BP fixed-point system for {mij (xi,xj)}(ij)∈E is solved by iteration. This formalism has been
employed for large-deviation analyses of a class of dynamical processes including applications to
epidemics [12, 13, 15, 31, 32], in particular regarding the patient zero problem and the inference
of causality chains of infection. We extended here previous works to deal with non-Markovian
processes and to make it computationally efficient through a limited time-window approximation
(see Supplemental Material).
Restricted to Markovian epidemic models, a simpler, Mean-Field approximation can be devised
starting from (1). It is based on assuming that p
(
xt
) ≈∏i p (xti), so that
p
(
xt+1i
) ≈ ∑
xti,x
t
∂i
p
(
xt+1i |xt∂i, xti
)
p
(
xti
) ∏
j∈∂i
p(xtj). (4)
Thanks to this factorization, one can write closed equations for the evolution of the individual
probabilities p(xti) for the simple prior model (1) along the same spirit as presented in [10, 11],
(see Supplemental Material).
For risk inference, we need to estimate the p(xti|O) in the full model (2) that includes the
observations. We show in the Supplemental Material a heuristic that incorporates the presence
of observations done at a time tobs into the Mean-Field equations. The algorithm propagates the
information on the population from tMF days before the current time and it simply takes into
account the following facts:
• If an individual is tested ’S’ at time tobs, it has been ’S’ at all previous times
• If an individual is tested ’R’ at time tobs, it will be ’R’ at all following times
• If an individual is tested ’I’ at time tobs, we assume that he has been ’I’ at times [tobs−τ, tobs],
where τ , the typical time between infection and observation, is a parameter of the algorithm.
Results We test the inference of risk on two types of epidemic spreading and contact networks.
• SIR spreading model on proximity-based random network: This is a simple SIR-model-
based propagation in a population of N individuals, where the graph of contact is updated
dynamically at each step as follows. The individuals are distributed uniformly in a square
of side
√
N , and at each time step a contact can be established between two individuals i
and j with a probability e−dij/`, where dij is the Euclidean distance between the points
and ` is a parameter that controls the density of the contact graph. We shall call this the
geometric contact model.
• Oxford OpenABM model: The second model is a much more realistic epidemic spread
model [1], which is aimed at capturing essential features of the contacts in real populations
as well as the real epidemiology of COVID-19, we call it the OpenABM model. In the
absence of sufficiently detailed real world data, we view the data from the OpenABM model
as realistic and our main point is to demonstrate that even though the proposed inference
procedures do not capture most of the details and complexity of this model, they still work
and provide large improvement over competing current contact tracing methods.
For the OpenABM model, we use in MF inference an extremely simplified hypothesis of
equal recovery rates, µi = µ, and transmission probabilities only divided into two classes (inter-
household contacts, with λk→i(t) = λ and intra-household contacts, with λk→i(t) = 2λ). The
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values of parameters µ and λ are chosen on the basis of population averages; they could also
be inferred from data. Note that arbitrarily heterogeneous parameters can be used if more
information is available, such as the duration of a contact. It is important to notice that the
MF algorithms that we derive from this simple model turn out to be very efficient at predicting
the risk of an individual to be infected, even in sophisticated propagation models that involve
individual and time-dependent rates µi and λk→i(t). The BP inference model is slightly more
complex (see Section C.4 for details), although still much simpler than the original OpenABM
propagation model.
In both models, we start the simulation at time 0 with everybody in the susceptible state
S except a small number of infected individuals. The number of these ”patients-zero” will be
specified in the following for each case.
We apply the following testing protocol. We observe a fraction of symptomatic individuals at
the day of symptoms. After a fixed number of days (tstart) the interventions start. Every day, we
perform a fixed amount nr of tests to the top individuals ranked as having the largest probabilities
of being infected, according to the different risk estimation strategies. We assume that the result
of the test is available on the same time step (day) and is included in the observations used to
adjust the probabilities of risk on the next time step (day).
Besides BP and MF risk estimation, the ranking strategies considered for comparison are:
• Random Guessing (RG): The nr individuals on which the tests are performed are randomly
chosen among the individuals that were not previously tested positive.
• Contact Tracing (CT): One ranks the individuals who have not been tested positive
previously according to the number of contacts with confirmed positive individuals during
the time interval [t− τ, t[, and tests the nr individuals with the largest number of contacts.
This is what would be possible to implement with the currently deployed mobile applications.
For BP and MF inference, the ranking is done as follows:
• Belief Propagation (BP) and Mean-Field (MF): One uses the algorithm (BP or MF) in
order to estimate the probabilities qti = p(x
t
i = I) of being infected at time t. Individuals
who have not been tested positive previously are ranked according to their risk qti , the nr
individuals with largest risk are tested. For BP, the rank is computed as the probability of
infection in the last δrank days. Prioritizing recent infections can be more effective as it
helps containing the ”boundary” of an ongoing outbreak.
We compare test-guided containment strategies based on MF, BP, RG and CT in a scenario
where quarantines are put in place when tested individuals result infected. We show that BP
and MF-based methods are able to predict infections and control the epidemic considerably more
successfully than the classic contact tracing strategy. Implementation of the MF and BP risk
estimation algorithms and all the tests that follow can be found at [22].
We evaluate the proposed framework in a pessimistic regime with 200 simultaneous independent
outbreaks that are discovered after ten days. We start with a simulation of the proximity-based
random network. Figure 1 shows the development of the epidemic over three months in a
population of 500 000 individuals, starting from 200 patients-zero, and performing nr = 1500
tests per day. In spite of rather large fluctuations from run to run, one sees a very clear signal
indicating that the proposed inference methods, MF and BP, largely improve upon the usual CT,
which is itself better than RG. The best inference method is clearly BP, but the simpler MF,
which is less demanding in terms of the amount of information exchanged between individuals,
and therefore easier to protect for better privacy, is also quite successful. Even in this pessimistic
regime both risk inference methods allow to slow down the epidemic spread by more than a
month compared to classic contact tracing.
In this first test we assumed that the model used for BP and MF inference coincides exactly with
underlying epidemic propagation model (SIR), which is overly optimistic. A much more stringent
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Figure 1: Spreading of the epidemics in a 2D geometric graph with 6 contacts on average
per day (scale of the graph is 1) and 500 000 individuals. The parameters of the
forward simulation of the SIR model are the same as used by the inference algorithms:
λ = 0.05, µ = 0.02. In the plot we show the average numbers (bold lines) of infected
individuals versus time of simulations among three different realizations (thin lines)
with 200 patients zero. The system freely evolves for the first 10 days, then interventions
start. We observe 50% of the infected individuals 5 days after their infection. We
perform 1500 tests every day according to the ranking given by the algorithms. The
observed infected individuals are quarantined. The MF parameters are τ = 5, tMF = 15.
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Figure 2: Effect of the control strategy on the epidemic spreading, according to the OpenABM
model, in a population of 500 000 individuals. In all the panels we show the number
of infected individuals in a time window of 100 days when interventions are applied
starting from day 10. The number of patients zero here is set to 50. Thin lines represent
the results for single instances of the epidemics, while the thick line is the average
among the different realizations. We compare the effect of an increasing number of
available medical tests per day (from left to right), performed to the individuals at
highest risk as evaluated by the corresponding strategy (RG, CT, MF and BP). The
top panels depict a scenario where only tested positive individuals are confined, limiting
their contacts to the cohabitants, while the bottom panels show how the number of
infected individuals change if the entire household is quarantined whenever an infected
member is detected.
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test has been performed on the more realistic OpenABM COVID-19 model. In this framework,
each infected individual can either be asymptomatic or show symptoms of various degree (mild or
severe). As in a realistic setting, we will consider an additional source of information: individuals
that show severe symptoms are immediately quarantined when symptoms emerge (typically 5
days after infection) or hospitalized. In addition, half of the mildly symptomatic individuals is
assumed to self-report and self-isolate as well. No direct information is available on asymptomatic
(or pre-symptomatic) infected individuals, their detection is possible only through contact tracing.
We mimic a post lock-down scenario where only a small fraction of individuals is initially
infected, i.e. few tens of patients zero in a population of 500 thousand individuals that all employ
a contact-tracing application. The epidemic dynamics freely evolves according to the OpenABM
model [21] for ten days and then a number of individuals with the highest infection risk, assessed
by RG, CT, MF, or BP, is tested on a daily basis. The MF algorithm assumes a Markovian SIR
spreading with parameters λ = 0.02 and µ = 1/12, and has parameters τ = 5 and tMF = 10. See
Section C.4 for details on the BP parameters. In these simulations, the result of the medical
tests is assumed to be exact; errors in tests will be addressed below. The number of medical
tests associated with the individuals detected by the mobile application is fixed while there is
no limitation on those performed to the fraction of symptomatic people presented above. The
original contact dynamics is then modified in agreement to two alternative strategies: tested
positive are confined and can have contacts only with their cohabitants or, whenever one person
results positive to the medical test, all the households are quarantined without being tested.
Figure 2 shows the number of infected individuals in a time interval of 100 days when the
number of initial infections is 50 and the intervention starts after 10 days. In the top panels,
we show the results for three independent realizations of the epidemics in the case where tested
positive individuals only are quarantined, while in the bottom panels we show the results for a
more restrictive intervention scenario in which all the households are confined. The number of
available tests per day increases from 625 to 5000 (from left to the right panels). The lines are
colored according to the adopted ranking strategy and the thick lines show the mean number
of infected individuals mediated on the three instances. The results suggest that for both the
inference strategies the size of the epidemics is significantly reduced if compared to the random
testing and also to the classic contact tracing, even when few tests are available. We remark
the behavior of the BP-based strategy when 1000 (1250 when the confinement is not extended
to the households) daily medical tests are performed: the confinement of the people inferred
by this method suffices to stop the epidemic after 75 days. The MF-based strategy performs
notably better than CT and it achieves similar performances to BP when the number of daily
observations is large.
In Figure 5 of the Supplemental Material we show the number of infected individuals for a
time window of 100 days in, to some extent, a different scenario, that is when the containment
measures are applied earlier in time, after a week from the beginning of the epidemics, and the
size of the epidemics at initial time is smaller than that examined in Figure 2.
Robustness of the inference In the previous section we investigated how several intervention
protocols (differing in the treatment of the households and the number of available tests) control
realistic epidemics when paired to the considered risk assessment strategies (RG, CT, MF and
BP). However, some of the conditions assumed in that section are not realistic. In reality, the
sensitivity of medical tests is not 100% and it is to be expected that only a fraction of the
population will adopt the app, so that not all contacts are detectable. In this section, we shall
address these two issues, focusing on the more realistic OpenABM model.
We first consider the case in which the results of the medical tests are inaccurate and therefore
there exists a fraction of the tested individuals incorrectly identified as uninfected or infected.
Concerning the fraction of false positive tests this simply puts a small additional fraction of
individual in isolation, but does not lead to deterioration of the epidemic control. We hence focus
on the influence of false negatives and test how the performance depends on the false negative
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rate (FNR) of the medical tests. We remark that within the Bayesian framework it is possible to
correctly include this information in a straight-forward way and we do so for the BP algorithm,
but not for the MF as we want to keep it as simple as possible and test its robustness. In Figure
3 we show the results of several simulations (three different realizations of the dynamics), starting
from the setting in Figure 2 with 2500 medical tests and the quarantine of the entire households,
when the FNR spans the range [0.09, 0.40]. We see that all the control strategies present good
robustness with respect to the false negative tests. The CT controls the spreading up to FNR
0.19, MF is robustly better than CT up about FNR 0.25. Remarkably the intervention based of
BP predictions not only limits the number of the infected individuals in time, but its performance
remains almost unchanged with respect to the noiseless case as it completely stops the epidemic
spreading even for large values of the FNR, up to 0.31. Figure 6 of the Supplemental Material
displays the results of the same experiment but starting from the initial setting of Figure 5 using
1000 medical tests, bottom panel. These results confirm the effectiveness of inference-based
ranking and reveal the robustness in a realistic scenario of a fully Bayesian approach such as
the proposed Belief Propagation in which the probabilistic evidence of tests can be consistently
included as priors.
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Figure 3: Effect of tests inaccuracy to the evolution of the controlled epidemics. We simulate the
same intervention protocol as Figure 2 for 2500 daily observations (bottom panel). We
consider here the effects of an additional source of noise, that is a non negligible false
negative rate (FNR) of the results of the medical tests, from 0.09 to 0.40.
We now turn to the study of partial adoption of the mobile application. This is done in
the simulation by hiding the contacts of a fraction of individuals (which are unknown to the
inference algorithm): these hidden contacts represent individuals without the application or
without smartphone. Figure 4 shows the result of mitigation, in the OpenABM model, with AF
(the fraction of individuals who have adopted the app) ranging between 0.6 and 0.9. It shows
that the method is still effective in presence of partially detected contacts. Although performance
is severely affected, one observes that even at AF equal to 0.6 the use of inference algorithms
allows to delay the spreading of the epidemic and to flatten the peak of infected individuals,
way more efficiently than the classical contact tracing strategy. Furthermore, it should be noted
that application utilization may be positively correlated to the number of contacts of individuals.
Including more detailed information about mobile application utilization e.g. in population age
classes may greatly reduce the impact of low adoption. Similar results are presented in the
Supplemental Material, Figure 7 for a smaller number of daily observations.
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Figure 4: Effect of a poor adoption fraction of the mobile application to the number of infected
individuals. We simulate the same intervention protocol as Figure 2 for 5000 daily
observations. We assume here that only a fraction of the population, from 90 % to
60%, uses the mobile application for contact tracing.
Conclusion The above results show that, in the regime where the epidemic is growing and
exhaustive testing of all contacts is unfeasible, inference methods allow to contain the epidemics
more efficiently than the classical tracing of contacts, which itself is better than random testing.
Both inference schemes require exchange of information between individuals during a limited
time window after they have been in contact, and could be implemented in contact-tracing
smartphone applications in a distributed way. Additionally, numerical tests show that the
approach is robust to false negatives in the test results as well as to partial adoption of the mobile
tracing applications, although the adoption rate required for efficient control of the epidemic
with the number of daily tests considered is large relative to the one of the currently deployed
applications.
The volume of daily exchanged messages per pair of individuals in the two proposed methods
is constant with respect to both the population size and time (a total of about 1kB for MF, 1MB
for BP per individual assuming ∼ 10 daily contacts). This volume is negligible when compared
with normal data usage. A privacy-preserving implementation will require an additional overload,
but the computational burden on the phone’s CPU will remain negligible.
Having access to the estimated posterior probability of being infected in time, a series of
threshold values could be put in place so as to suggest actions on individuals, including reduction
of contacts, self-isolation and testing.
With regard to privacy, it is worth emphasizing that the proposed inference methods are
in principle more protective than the usual (manual) tracing. On the one hand, both can be
implemented in a fully distributed way using point to point cryptography without fully centralized
processing and storage of information on infections or contacts. On the other hand, by identifying
individuals who have the largest probability of being infected through a cumulative process by
which information is integrated, the direct attribution of potential infection events to a given
individual is made much harder. Details of such fully privacy preserving implementation, along
the lines of [4], are left for future work.
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A. Brief description of the OpenABM model
The OpenABM computational model by R. Hinch et al. [21] involves simulating epidemic
propagation in an age-stratified population based on the UK national census data (see Table 1 in
[21]). Each individual is represented by a node of a multi-layered network and takes part in three
different subnets describing different social contexts: two static subnets represent households
and workplaces while a degree-heterogeneous random network, different every day, represents the
occasional interactions which individuals have on a daily basis. Age stratification influences both
the composition of households (the elderly tend to live with other elderly, children preferably
live with young adults) and the social activity level of individuals (e.g. participation in the
workplace network, average number of random daily interactions). The epidemic states considered
by the model are those discussed above, apart from the exposed state, which is not explicitly
modeled. Hospitalization and/or death is possible only for severely symptomatic patients, while
the resistant state is eventually reached in case of no or mild symptoms. The epidemic dynamics
is modeled as a discrete-time stochastic process, with a temporal resolution of one day, in which
infected individuals can transmit the disease with a (daily) infection rate which depends mainly
on the symptomatic state of the potential infector, the age of the potential infected and the time
passed since the potential infector became infected. The latter dependence, modeled through a
Gamma distribution, is an attempt to describe the temporal variation of the infectiousness level
of SARS-CoV-2. In particular, the incubation period (usually represented by the E state), is here
implicitly taken into account by assuming an infectiousness level which does not immediately
grow from zero. Finally, the infection rate depends on an intrinsic infectiousness level of the
virus and on the type of network on which the contact occurs. Although the notion of duration
of contacts is not present, the infectiousness rate associated with contacts inside households is
larger than for the other environments, to account for the typically longer duration of domestic
interactions. With the exception of the viral transmission process just described, all other
possible transitions between individual epidemic states (e.g. transition from mild symptomatic
infected state to the resistant state) are independent of the state of the other individuals. These
events are characterized by a (discrete) waiting time, also distributed according to a Gamma
distribution or, in case of dichotomous support, according to a shifted Bernoulli distribution.
The parameters of these distributions have been extracted from recent SARS-CoV-2 literature
and are summarized in Tables 5-6-7 of Hinch et al. [21].
The model provides the possibility of intervention in order to slow down and, if possible,
contain the epidemic outbreak. In particular, it is possible to introduce interventions of increasing
severity, from case-based measures (e.g. quarantine for individuals which are positive to swab tests
and their housemates) to mobility restrictions for some categories of individuals and lockdown
scenarios. In this respect, the OpenABM model is very appropriate for the implementation
of contact tracing strategies. Finally, the OpenABM model also provides for the possibility
of varying the adoption fraction of the contact tracing app within the population, possibly
introducing different percentages of adoption in different age groups of individuals.
B. Mean-Field Inference of Risk
The mean field inference is based on a prior epidemic model which is an agent-based SIR model.
At each time, an individual i is in either one of the three states: Susceptible, Infected, Removed,
xi(t) ∈ {S, I,R} (where the ”Removed” state means either dead, or recovered and having acquired
immunity).
When going from time t to time t+ 1, the following events can take place:
• If xi(t) = R: xi(t+ 1) = R.
• If xi(t) = I: we call µi the probability that an infected individual i recovers:
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{
xi(t+ 1) = I with probability 1− µi
xi(t+ 1) = R with probability µi
• If xi(t) = S: One looks at all the individuals j which are infected and have been in contact
with i at time t (in practice this means between day t and day t+ 1). Define this set of
individuals as ∂i(t). Each individual j in ∂i(t) infects i with a probability λj→i(t). More
precisely:{
xi(t+ 1) = I with probability 1−
∏
j∈∂i(t) (1− λj→i(t))
xi(t+ 1) = S with probability
∏
j∈∂i(t) (1− λj→i(t))
To resume, the parameters of the model are:
• µi: The probability of removal of the infectious patient i.
• λi→j(t): The transmission probability given that there was a contact between an infected
i and susceptible j at time t. This depends on i, j and on t, depending on the duration
and nature of contacts between i and j between day t and t+ 1 transmission probability
changes with contact time, as well as the sanitary measures, such as wearing masks.
From these rules one obtains the propagation of the epidemic p
(
xti|xt−1∂i , xt−1i
)
as defined in
eq. (1).
In order to understand and monitor the propagation of the epidemic, and to develop mitigating
strategies, it is important to evaluate the probabilities that individual j is in state S, I or R at a
given time t. We denote these probabilities respectively by P jS(t), P
j
I (t), P
j
R(t).
These marginal probabilities are in general difficult to evaluate. A straightforward strategy for
this evaluation is to simulate a large number of instances of the propagation, and estimate P jS(t)
as the fraction of instances where individual j is in state S at time t. However this requires
a centralized system, and a large computing power. Here, instead, we use some approximate
techniques from statistical physics, that allow for a good estimate of P jS(t) through a fully
distributed method, using only simple exchange of information at each contact.
The Mean-Field (MF) method computes the marginal probabilities of (1) through an iterative
process. The probability of individual j receiving the infection from her contact k at time t
depends on their contact transmission λk→j(t) and on the joint probability of j being S and
k being I at time t. The mean field approximation estimates this joint probability by the
product P jS(t)P
k
I (t). Using this approximation, one can write the probability that individual j is
susceptible at time t+ 1 as
P jS(t+ 1) = P
j
S(t)
∏
k∈∂j(t)
(
1− P kI (t)λk→j(t)
)
. (5)
The probability of being recovered is
P jR(t+ 1) = P
j
R(t) + µjP
j
I (t) (6)
and the probability of being infected is obtained using the fact that PS + PR + PI = 1. In
practice, considering that the probability of transmission is small, our MF algorithm is based on
the following linearized form for PS (and we have checked that this linearization is fine in the
regimes of epidemic propagation that we explore):
P jS(t+ 1) = P
j
S(t)
1− ∑
k∈∂j(t)
P kI (t)λk→j(t)
 ,
P jR(t+ 1) = P
j
R(t) + µjP
j
I (t),
P jI (t+ 1) = P
j
I (t) + P
j
S(t)
∑
k∈∂j(t)
P kI (t)λk→j(t)− µjP jI (t). (7)
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The mean-field equations have an intuitive content which is easy to understand. They basically
reproduce in an agent-dependent model the equations used for the global monitoring of the
proportions of S,I,R states in a population. They can also be derived as a limiting case of the
dynamical message passing equations from [10], when the transmission probabilities are small.
This approach offers several advantages. Every individual j can estimate her probabilities
P jS(t), P
j
I (t), P
j
R(t) every day, by updating the equations (7). These probabilities can be stored
in her phone. For the update, individual j needs to receive, during the contact with k, the
information on λk→j(t) and the information from k about his estimates of P kS (t), P
k
I (t), P
k
R(t).
The value of λk→j(t) is the standard contact-tracing information, which estimates the encounter
duration within a certain distance, as used in all contact tracing applications that are being
developed, for instance based on bluetooth signals between the phones of j and k. On top of
this, the phone of individual k should send the values of P kS (t) and P
k
I (t) to individual j during
the contact, and reciprocally. The information is fully distributed, there is no need for a central
system that stores the full information, and the data exchange can be encrypted.
We suppose that, at time tobs an individual i is tested or presents illness-associated syndromes.
Then the state of i is known: xobsi (t) ∈ {S, I,R} and P iq(tobs) = δq,qobsi (t). In case of syndromes at
time tobs the probability P
i
q(tobs) is updated on the basis of external medical data, namely the
probability to be infected among all people presenting the same set of syndromes.
A simple inference method that turns out to be quite efficient consists in adapting the mean-field
equations (7) in order to take into account the results of tests and symptoms. The information
about tests and syndroms must be propagated back in time and be used to update the risk levels
of the contacts of person i in recent times. Assume that we are estimating the probabilities
for each individual i to be in each of the three states q at a given time t, P iq(t). We run the
mean-field equations (7) starting at time t− tMF with the whole population S, and imposing
the constraints due to the tests done in the interval [t − tMF , t] as follows. If j is tested at a
time tobs in this interval, then:
if xj(tobs) = S : P
j
S(t
′) = 1 for t′ ∈ [t− tMF , tobs] (8)
if xj(tobs) = I : P
j
I (t
′) = 1 for tobs − τ ≤ t′ ≤ tobs (9)
if xj(tobs) = R : P
j
R(t
′) = 1 for t′ ≥ tobs (10)
Our inference procedure depends on two parameters: τ is the typical time between the infection
and the testing consecutive to the apparition of syndroms, and tMF is the integration time of
the mean-field procedure.
C. Belief Propagation Inference of Risk
C.1. Graphical model setting
Each pair i, j of individuals will be in mutual contact in a finite set of instants Xij ⊂ R∞ =
R ∪ {+∞}. For reasons that will become clear in the following, we will always assume ∞ ∈ Xij .
As time advances, instantaneous contagion will happen with probability λ at time sij ∈ Xij if
i is infected and j is susceptible. We will assume λ = λ
sij ,ti
ij, to possibly depend both on the
specific (absolute) contact time sij , on the direction of the contact and on the time ti of infection
of individual i. Individual i can thus become infected in one instant in the set Xi = ∪j∈∂iXij .
We will denote by ti ∈ Xi, ri ∈ R respectively the times of infection and recovery of individual i,
with ti =∞ (resp. ri =∞) if the individual did not become infected (resp. recovered) within
the time-frame.
We will assume the recovery delay ri − ti of node i to be distributed with a continuous
distribution with pdf pR,i (ri − ti). We will assume a set of factorized, site-dependent observations
pO,i (Oi|ti, ri). Model parameters will be hidden for the moment inside functions pR,i, λs,tij , and
pO,i and we will include them only later to avoid cluttering the notation.
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The standard SIR model can be obtained by setting pR,i (ri − ti) = µe−µ(ri−ti), λs,tij ≡ λ. In
this setup, the model is memory-less (Markov) on the state of infection variables xti ∈ {S, I,R}.
In the following we will always assume that ti ∈ Xi and sij , sji ∈ Xij . Given the times of
infection and recovery ti and ri, the transmission delay sij has “truncated” generalized geometric
distribution
Sij (sij |ti, ri) = I [ti < sij < ri] λsij ,tiij
∏
ti<s<sij
(
1− λs,tiij
)
+ I [sij =∞]
∏
s≥ri
(
1− λs,tiij
)
(11)
because i will be infectious in the open time interval (ti, ri) and will possibly (i.e. if j is susceptible
at the time) transmit the disease at some time sij in that interval if he did not transmit it before.
If time ri arrives and he did not transmit the disease, the individual will recover and never
transmit the disease through that link; then transmission time on that link will be nominally
sij =∞. Special attention must be taken for auto-infections (otherwise, no infection can enter
into the closed system). By adding a contact with an additional extra always-infected virtual
neighbor it∗ to node i at time instant t ∈ Xi with probability pt (sit∗i = t) = γti (typically small),
pt (sit∗i =∞) = 1 − γti , i will spontaneously self-infect at time t with probability γti (if it is
susceptible at that time1). Let us define Ai (si∗) = Ai
({sit∗i}t∈Xi) = ∏t∈Xi\{∞} pt (sit∗i). For
convenience, let us define ∂∗i the enlarged neighborhood of i including all extra nodes
{
it∗
}
t∈Xi .
Given {ski} for k ∈ ∂∗i, the infection time ti satisfies, in a deterministic way:
ti = min
k∈∂∗i
ski, (12)
We can now write the joint pdf of discrete variables t, s and continuous variables r as
p (t, r, s) ∝
∏
i
δ
(
ti, min
k∈∂∗i
ski
)
Ai (si∗)Ri (ri − ti)
∏
(ij)
Sij (sij |ti, ri) (13)
so then as p (t, r, s|O) ∝ p (O|t, r) p (t, r, s), we get
p (t, r, s|O) ∝
∏
i
δ
(
ti, min
k∈∂∗i
ski
)
Ai (si∗)Ri (ri − ti) pO,i (Oi|ti, ri)
∏
(ij)
Sij (sij |ti, ri) (14)
A note about ris: all terms in (14) except Ri are constant as functions of ri in any interval
(rˆi, rˆ
′
i) of consecutive times in Xi. We will exploit this fact and write ri = rˆi + ui, where
rˆi = max {r ∈ Xi : r < ri}. Integrating away the ui variables in (14), we obtain an all-discrete
model for variables t, s, rˆ, with an identical expression to (14) but in which ri has been replaced
by rˆi and Ri (ri − ti) by Rˆi (rˆi − ti) =
∫ rˆ′i−ti
rˆi−ti pR,i (u) du. For simplicity of notation, we will drop
theˆsymbols in the following.
C.2. Belief propagation equations
A naive interpretation of (14) as a graphical model would introduces many unneeded short cycles
that were not present in the original contact network. For example, pairs (ti, sji) , (ti, sij) , (tj , sij) , (tj , sji)
share respectively factors with indices i, (ij) , j, (ji) , effectively forming a small cycle. A simple
solution consists in regrouping factors as in (15) and considering (sij , sji) as a single variable:
Ψi
(
ti, ri, {ski, sik}k∈∂i
)
= δ
(
ti, min
k∈∂∗i
ski
)
Ai (si∗)Ri (ri − ti)
∏
j∈∂i
Sij (sij |ti, ri) (15)
1A particularly interesting case is with γ0i = γ → 0 and γti = 0 for t > 0: in this case individuals can be
self-infected only at time 0, representing a closed system with a single unknown seed at time t = 0.
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which results in a factor graph for (14) in which variables (sij , sji) have degree two and live in
the middle of the original edges, and vars ti, ri have degree 1, i.e. a topology that closely follows
the one of the original contact network:
p (t, r, s|O) = 1
Z
∏
i
Ψi (16)
The corresponding BP equations for Ψi are
mij (sij , sji) ∝
∑
ti
∑
ri
pO,i (Oi|ti, ri)Ai (si∗)Ri (ri − ti)Sij (sij |ti, ri)× (17)
×
∑
{ski}
δ
(
ti, min
k∈∂∗i
ski
) ∏
k∈∂∗i\j
Sik (sik|ti, ri)mki (ski, sik)
and marginals for ti are
bi (ti) ∝
∑
ri
pO,i (Oi|ti, ri)Ai (si∗)Ri (ri − ti)Sij (sij |ti, ri)× (18)
×
∑
{ski}
δ
(
ti, min
k∈∂∗i
ski
) ∏
k∈∂∗i
Sik (sik|ti, ri)mki (ski, sik) (19)
and similarly for ri. A more efficient computation of the equations can be achieved by defining:
G0k (ti, ri) =
∑
ski≥ti
sik>ti
Sik (sik|ti, ri)mki (ski, sik)
G1k (ti, ri) =
∑
ski>ti
sik>ti
Sik (sik|ti, ri)mki (ski, sik)
and substituting the extra neighbor message
mi∗ti (si∗ti, sii∗t) =
{
γti si∗ti = t, sii∗t =∞
1− γti si∗ti =∞, sii∗t =∞
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Equations (17), (18) can be then rewritten as
mij (sij , sji) ∝
∑
ti
∑
ri
pO,i (Oi|ti, ri)Ai (si∗)Ri (ri − ti)Sij (sij |ti, ri)× (20)
×
∑
{ski}
 ∏
j∈∂∗i
I [ski ≥ ti]−
∏
j∈∂∗i
I [ski > ti]
 ∏
k∈∂∗i\j
Sik (sik|ti, ri)mki (ski, sik)
∝
∑
ti<sji
∑
ri≥ti
pO,i (Oi|ti, ri)Ri (ri − ti)Sij (sij |ti, ri)× (21)
×
{ ∏
k∈∂i\j
G0k (ti, ri)−
(
1− γtii
) ∏
k∈∂i\j
G1k (ti, ri)
}
+
+
∑
ri≥sji
pO,i (Oi|sji, ri)Ri (ri − sji)
∏
k∈∂i\j
G0k (sji, ri)
bi (ti) ∝
∑
ri
pR,i (ri − ti) pO,i (Oi|ti, ri)× (22){ ∏
k∈∂i
G0k (ti, ri)−
(
1− γtii
) ∏
k∈∂i
G1k (ti, ri)
}
bi (ri) ∝
∑
ti
pR,i (ri − ti) pO,i (Oi|ti, ri)× (23){ ∏
k∈∂i
G0k (ti, ri)−
(
1− γtii
) ∏
k∈∂i
G1k (ti, ri)
}
Note that products
∏
k∈∂i\j Gk can be computed simultaneously for j ∈ ∂i in time O (|∂i|)
(either by computing it as the fraction G−1j
∏
k∈∂iGk, or by first recursively computing
∏`′
`=1Gk`
and
∏|∂i|
`=`′ Gk` for `
′ = 1, . . . , |∂i| and then ∏`6=`′ Gk` = ∏`′−1`=1 Gk`∏|∂i|`=`′+1Gk` , a method that
does not involve divisions and is thus numerically more stable). The resulting implementation of
the update of all messages in factor Ψi has complexity O
(
|Xi|
∑
j∈∂i
(
|Xi|+ |Xij |2
))
.
C.3. Finite-window approximation
In the BP-based epidemic tracing scheme, exchanged messages between two individuals grow
quadratically with the number of temporal contacts occurred between them. However, only
recent contacts are important to determine marginal probabilities at present time, therefore
keeping only a short time window (about two or three weeks) is sufficient to obtain quasi-optimal
results. For better accuracy, information about contacts and observations at the dropped times is
included approximately as simple factorized priors applied at the start of the window. This prior
contains the posterior probability at the first non-dropped time computed only using contacts and
observations at the dropped time (and the prior computed in the previous step). All simulations
have been performed using a 21 days time window.
C.4. Algorithm Parameters
For the OpenABM model, we chose to use Gamma distributions for the recovery density pR.i = pR
and a rescaled Gamma for the infection transmissivity λ
sij ,ti
ij = pI(sij − ti). The five parameters
were fitted from experimental data produced by the model (parameters could in principle be
also learned or adjusted online during the process through an approximate maximum likelihood
procedure [13], but we leave this for future work). Note that the model used for inference with
BP is still much simplified with respect to OpenABM itself, in particular having only three states
(against 11 in OpenABM). As a consequence, results are only weakly sensitive to the parameters.
The used values were Gamma(k = 10, µ = 0.57) for pR and Gamma(k=5.76, µ = 0.96), with
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Figure 5: Effect of the control strategy on the epidemic spreading. In all the panels we show the
number of infected individuals in a time window of 100 days when some intervention is
applied starting from day 7. The number of patients zero here is set to 20. Thin lines
represent the results for single instances of the epidemics, while the think line is the
average among the different realizations. We compare the effect of an increasing number
of available medical tests per day (from left to right), performed to the individuals at
risk suggested by the app. The top panels depict a scenario where only tested positive
individuals are confined, limiting their contacts to the cohabitants, while the bottom
panels show how the number of infected individuals change if the entire household is
quarantined whenever an infected is detected.
a scale of 0.25 (multiplied by 2 for intra-household contacts as with MF inference) for λ. The
self-infection probability was chosen to be pseed = 1/N at time t = 0 (k/N where k is the number
of patient zeros would bring slightly better results, but would use inaccessible information) and
0 for t > 0 except for the case with partial adoption, in which we allowed a small probability
of self-infections at times t > 0 to avoid plain incompatibility between the inference model and
observations due to undetected transmissions). The parameter δrank for the computation of the
ranking was chosen to be 10 days.
D. Additional Results
In this section, we present additional results to stress how the containment measures associated
with the inference-based methods proposed in the main text, are effective in limiting the epidemics.
We consider a realistic spreading dynamics given by the OpenABM model [21] and, unlike the
setting illustrated in the main text, we study the case in which the restrictions are applied earlier
in time (i.e. after a week from the beginning of the epidemics) and the size of the epidemics at
the initial time is smaller (the number of patients zero here is 20), being also consistent with an
earlier intervention scenario.
In Figure 5, we display the behavior of the number of infected individuals as a function of
time, similarly to Figure 2 of the main text. Qualitatively, we retrieve the same behavior we have
observed in Figure 2: inference-based ranking allows for a more effective intervention resulting in
a remarkable decrease of the number of infected individuals, and when the number of tests is
sufficiently large, the epidemics are stopped in slightly more than two months. Quantitatively, we
notice that to control the spreading a reduced number of daily medical tests are needed (about
ten times less than those used for the results in Figure 2), suggesting that early intervention is
equally effective with a more parsimonious usage of testing resources.
Figure 6 suggests how robust the containment measures are when the medical tests are
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Figure 6: Effect of tests inaccuracy to the evolution of the controlled epidemics. We simulate the
same intervention protocol as Figure 5 for 1000 daily observations (bottom panel). We
consider here the effects of an additional source of noise, that is a non negligible false
negative rate (FNR) of the results of the medical tests, from 0.09 to 0.40.
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Figure 7: Effect of a poor adoption fraction of the app to the number of infected individuals. We
simulate the same intervention protocol as Figure 5 for 1000 daily observations. We
assume here that only a fraction of the population, from 90 % to 60%, uses the app for
contact tracing.
inaccurate. We quantify their sensitivity through a false-negative rate (FNR) of the medical
tests (similar results are discussed in the main text, see Figure 3). The setting is the same as in
Figure 5 when 1000 medical tests are performed to the individuals who present the higher risk
to be infected, according to RG, CT, MF, and BP. These curves support the conclusion of the
main text: inference-based methods successfully contain an epidemic in a realistic setting with
non-zero FNR. Indeed, CT and MF are able to contain the epidemics up to FNR equal to 0.09
and 0.25, respectively. BP shows the most robust performance as it is able to stop the epidemics
even for larger values of the FNR, up to 0.31.
Finally, we show the average epidemic size as a function of the time in Figure 7 when only a
fraction of the population uses the app for contact tracing and, therefore, only partial information
on potentially infectious contacts is available to the risk assessment methods. Up to an adoption
fraction of 0.7, inference-based methods (MF and BP) allows for a significantly slowing down of
the epidemic spreading compared to both the random and CT-based testing.
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